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Part 1 of this Note will attempt a definition of terrorism to determine whether the Tel-Oren
attack was a terrorist act. Part II will discuss whether terrorism is a tort in violation of the law of
nations for purposes of Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction. Part III will examine United States cases in-
terpreting the term “violation of the law of nations” in the Alien Tort Statute and will then analyze
the district court’s opinion in Tel-Oren, particularly its holding that Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction
requires that the law of nations or a treaty confer a private right of action upon individuals. Finally,
Part IV will consider the implications of a court of appeals reversal in Tel-Oren and a holding that
jurisdiction lies under the Alien Tort Statute.
TERRORISM AS A TORT IN VIOLATION
OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
INTRODUCTION
A recent case' discusses whether the Alien Tort Statute' provides
subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts in a case involving an
incident which has been described as an international terrorist
attack.3 The Alien Tort Statute furnishes a basis for federal subject
matter jurisdiction when an alien sues in federal court for a tort
committed in violation of the law of nations or a United States
treaty . 4
Before determining whether a terrorist act gives rise to a cause of
action under the Alien Tort Statute, two preliminary issues must be
addressed. First, it is necessary to examine whether terrorism is a
tort5 in violation of the law of nations within the meaning of the
Alien Tort Statute, and second, whether, as suggested by some cases
interpreting the Alien Tort Statute,6 international law must provide
1. Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), Nos. 81-
1870 and 81-1871 (D.C. Cir. argued Mar. 24, 1982).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
3. See Brief for Appellants at 29, Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F.
Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), Nos. 81-1870 and 81-1871 (D.C. Cir. argued Mar. 24, 1982)
[hereinafter referred to as Appellants' Brief].
4. The Alien Tort Statute reads as follows: "The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
The original predecessor of this statute is found in the Judiciary Act of 1789, enacted by
the First Congress. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat.
73 (1789). Its text is very similar to that of the present-day statute:
That the districts courts ... shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts
of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an
alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.
Id. at 76-77.
There appears to be no legislative history on this statute, although it is in keeping with the
constitutional mandate that foreign affairs should be controlled by the federal government.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). There is only sparse early case law
on the statute. See infra text accompanying notes 69-73.
5, The "tort of terrorism" will, in this Note, mean the torts of wrongful death, battery,
assault, false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress which are commit-
ted in the context of a terrorist act, that is, an act of violence with international repercussions
directed against non-combattants or diplomats and intended to exert political pressure. See
infra text accompanying notes 20-37.
6, See, e.g., Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835
(1976). ---
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a right of action before an individual may successfully enter federal
court under the statute.
The catalyst for this discussion is the case of Hanoch Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 7 currently pending before the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A group of Israeli
plaintiffs, victims of a bus attack8 in Israel by El Fatah,9 are suing
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (P. L.O.), the Libyan Arab
Republic and the National Association of Arab Americans 10 for
multiple tortious acts allegedly committed in the attack." Plaintiff-
appellants allege the Alien Tort Statute as one of the bases for
subject matter jurisdiction, 2 on the theory that terrorism is a tort
committed in violation of the law of nations. 13
7. 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), Nos. 81-1870 and 81-1871 (D.C. Cir. argued Mar. 24,
1982).
8. The facts underlying the Tel-Oren case, as related in the New York Times, are as
follows:
On March 11, 1978, members of El Fatah, a faction of the P.L.O. allegedly came by ship
from Lebanon and landed on an Israeli beach near Haifa. There they shot an individual on
the beach who apparently had witnessed their landing. The Palestinians then fired through
the windshield of a bus carrying civilians to force it to stop. When the passengers sought to
leave the bus and seek shelter, the gunmen fired at them. They also fired at passing cars,
inflicting additional casualties.
The Palestinians seized a passing Mercedes and filled it with arms and explosives. Then
another bus arrived on the scene, and passengers got off to help the wounded from the attack
on the first bus. At gun point, the Arabs forced these passengers and survivors from the first
attack onto the original bus. They ordered the driver to proceed to Tel Aviv.
Learning of the attack, the police tried to stop the bus with barricades. With a gun
pointed at his head, the driver was forced to go through the barriers. On the outskirts of Tel-
Aviv, the police managed to halt the bus by firing at its tires. The attackers threw grenades
from the windows and fired automatic rifles at police. One Israeli reported seeing a gunman
leave the bus and throw grenades at it, setting it ablaze. Most of the passengers managed to
escape before the bus blew up, but at least 37 Israelis were killed in the attack. The
Palestinians were all killed during the fierce fighting between the raiders and police. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 12, 1978, at Al, col. 8; N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1978, at A14, col. 1.
9. El Fatah, a major constituent faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization,
claimed credit for the attack. N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1978, at Al, col. 8.
10. The Libyan Arab Republic was named as a defendant for allegedly recruiting and
training the attackers. Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 8-9. The National Association of
Arab Americans (N.A.A.A.) was named as a defendant for allegedly funding and otherwise
assisting the P.L.O. Id. at 9. Service was not completed on the P.L.O. and Libya. 517 F.
Supp. at 545 n. 1. The Palestine Congress of North America and the Palestine Information
Office were originally defendants, but the appeal was not pursued against them, for unspeci-
fied reasons. Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at vi.
11. Id. at 8; 517 F. Supp. at 544.
12. Plaintiffs also allege as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp.
IV 1980) (federal question jurisdiction). Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 19.
13. Id. at 29-32.
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Part I of this Note will attempt a definition of terrorism to
determine whether the Tel-Oren attack was a terrorist act. Part II
will discuss whether terrorism is a tort in violation of the law of
nations for purposes of Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction. Part III will
examine United States cases interpreting the term "violation of the
law of nations" in the Alien Tort Statute and will then analyze the
district court's opinion in Tel-Oren, particularly its holding that
Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction requires that the law of nations or a
treaty confer a private right of action upon individuals. 14 Finally,
Part IV will consider the implications of a court of appeals reversal
in Tel-Oren and a holding that jurisdiction lies under the Alien Tort
Statute.
I. TOWARD A DEFINITION OF TERRORISM
No generally accepted definition of terrorism exists15 because
what to one party to a conflict is terrorism will be, to another, the
actions of freedom fighters in a national liberation movement.' "
14. The district court did not reach the substantive question of whether terrorism is a
violation of the law of nations allowing Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction, because it held that
international law did not provide plaintiffs with a private cause of action. 517 F. Supp. at
546. The court held that an action under § 1350 predicated on a treaty or on the law of
nations must be based on a private right of action, and that the treaty or the law of nations
under which the plaintiffs claim Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction must provide such specific
private right of action. Id. at 549.
Although the scope of this Note is limited to the Alien Tort Statute, the Alien Tort Statute
was only one of the bases of jurisdiction claimed by plaintiffs, see supra note 12, and it was
only one of the grounds on which subject matter jurisdiction was denied. See 517 F. Supp. at
549-50. Federal question jurisdiction was denied because of lack of a private right of action
under a United States treaty, as explained above. See injra text accompanying notes 96-101.
Jurisdiction under the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976), was not operative because
aliens were parties on both side of the suit. 517 F. Supp. at 549 n.3. Jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1330 (1976) (Actions Against Foreign States) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976)
(Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States) was held improper because sovereign immunity
was in effect for tort claims arising in Israel. 517 F. Supp. at 549-50 n.3. Finally, the court
held that the torts of assault, battery and false imprisonment arising out of the attack were
barred by the District of Columbia's one-year statute of limitations, and that the torts of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment were not different enough from the torts from which they arose to
justify applying the three-year limitation period. Id. at 550.
15. B. JENKINS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A NEW MODE OF CONFLICr 9 (1975); STAFF OF
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON INTERNAL SECUarTY, 93D Cong., 2D SESs., TERRORISM 5
(Comm. Print 1974).
16. See B. JENKINS, supra note 15, at 10. In addition, Jenkins notes:
The problem of defining terrorism is compounded by the fact that terrorism has
recently become a fad word used promiscuously and often applied to a variety of
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One reason there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism is
that by defining it, one either condones or condemns its adherents,
and in so doing, takes a tacit position on the issue of whether
terrorism is a violation of international law. 17
"Terrorism" has been defined as "the systematic use of terror
[especially] as a means of coercion. ' 18 "Terror" is "violence . ..
committed by groups in order to intimidate a population or govern-
ment into granting their demands ..... 19 Terrorism is distinguish-
able from revolution. "Revolution" is defined as a "complete over-
throw of the established government in any country or state by
those who were previously subject to it. "20 Terrorism and revolu-
tion both attempt to effect political outcomes. Revolution, how-
ever, is an overthrow of the established government by its previous
subjects without necessarily pejorative connotations, whereas ter-
rorism embodies the use of coercion through terror to achieve politi-
cal goals. 21
International terrorism has been called "a strategy of terror-
inspiring violence containing an international element and commit-
acts of violence which are not strictly terrorism by definition. It is generally pejora-
tive. Some governments are prone to label as terrorism all violent acts committed by
their political opponents, while antigovernment extremists frequently claim to be
the victims of government terror. What is called terrorism thus seems to depend on
point of view. Use of the term implies a moral judgement; and if one party can
successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly per-
suaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint. Terrorism is what the bad guys do.
Id. at 2.
It is interesting, and not altogether surprising, to note that the Tel-Oren Appellants' Brief
uses the words "terrorism" and "terrorist" throughout to describe the attack of March 11,
1978. Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 8, 9, 10-18, 24, 29. Whereas in appellees' brief, the
words "terrorism" and "terrorist" virtually never appear. The events in question are dis-
creetly referred to as "the incident." Brief for Appellee at 3 nn.3-4, 4, 7, 8 n.8, 10, 12,
Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), Nos. 81-1870
and 81.1871 (D.C. Cir. argued Mar. 24, 1982).
17. See B. JENINS, supra note 15, at 10.
18. WEBSTsR's NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1195 (1981).
19. Id.
20. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1188 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). A revolt is distinguished from an
insurrection:
A revolt goes beyond insurrection in aim, being an attempt actually to overthrow
the government itself, whereas insurrection has as its objective some forcible change
within the government. A large-scale revolt is called a rebellion and if it is successful
it becomes a revolution.
Id.
21. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
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ted by individuals to produce power outcomes. 2 2 It has also been
more broadly defined as acts of terrorism with international reper-
cussions, and as violence outside the accepted norms of diplomacy
and war. 23
National governments do not agree on a definition of terrorism.24
Each government tends to define it so as to proscribe those acts
which are most likely to be directed against itself. 25 Many nations
exclude from their definition "national wars of liberation" which
they support or may wish to employ.26 Most Western nations,
however, describe national liberation movements which engage in
"violence with an international element designed to produce power
outcomes," as simply, terrorist. 27
The United States Department of State, in the context of a
discussion of terrorist attacks on diplomats, has written:
All terrorist attacks involve the use of violence for purposes of
political extortion, coercion, and publicity for a political
cause....
22. Bassiouni, An International Control Scheme for the Prosecution of International
Terrorism: An Introduction, in LECAL AspEcrs OF INTERNATIONAL TERRoRISM 485 (A.E.
Evans & J.F. Murphy eds. 1978).
23. B. JENKINS, supra note 15, at 10.
24. A group of Third World nations, including Algeria, Congo, Guinea, India, Maurita-
nia, Nigeria, Southern Yemen, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire and
Zambia, proposed the following definition of "terrorism":
(1) Acts of violence and other repressive acts by colonial, racist and alien r6gimes
against peoples struggling for their liberation, for their legitimate right to self-
determination, independence and other human rights and fundamental freedoms;
(2) Tolerating or assisting by a State the organizations of the remnants of fascists
or mercenary groups whose terrorist activity is directed against other sovereign
countries;
(3) Acts of violence committed by individuals or groups of individuals which
endanger or take innocent human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms. This
should not affect the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all
peoples under colonial and racist r6gimes and other forms of alien domination and
the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular of national liberation movements, in
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the relevant of the
organs of the United Nations;
(4) Acts of violence committed by individuals or groups of individuals for private
gain, the effects of which are not confined to one State.
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 28 U.N. CAOR Supp. (No. 28)
at 21, U.N. Doc. A/9028 (1973).
25. B. JENKINS, supra note 15, at 10.
26. Id.
27. See generally CONTROL OF TERRoisM: INTERNATIONAL DOcUMENTS ix-xiv (Y. Alexan-
der, M.A. Browne & A.S. Nanes eds. 1979).
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[A]ll attacks ... have one element in common: All terrorist
attacks are acts of political violence. The terrorist is seeking to
redress a political grievance, overthrow a political system, or
publicize a political point of view.2 8
The relevant State Department criterion for evaluating whether an
act is terrorist is the use of violence for political ends; to coerce or
overthrow a government, or to gain publicity for a political cause. 29
A working definition of international terrorism, which encom-
passes elements of the definitions already discussed, may be phrased
as terror-inspiring violence 30 having international repercussions
3
'
engaged in by individuals32 against non-combatants, civilians, in-
ternationally protected persons33 or states to achieve a political
end .34
If this definition is applied to the attack in Tel-Oren, then the
attack may justifiably be called terrorist. The attack was terror-
inspiring in that it was of a random nature, rather than aimed at a
military target.35 The attack was launched from Lebanon by indi-
28. Perez, Terrorist Target: The Diplomat, DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 1982, at 24-25. See
infra note 33.
29. Telephone interview with Norman Antokol, Public Affairs Officer, Office for Com-
batting Terrorism, U.S. Department of State (Oct. 1, 1982).
30. The phrase "terror-inspiring violence" is borrowed from Bassiouni, see supra note 22
and accompanying text, and is used to denote violence which is of a more random nature
than violence by, for example, participants in a civil war or armed conflict. As recognized by
the United States Department of State, see supra note 28, worldwide publicity is frequently
of greater value to those engaging in violent acts than the outcome of those acts as military
ventures. See id.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23. Terrorist acts engaged in by individuals
entirely within their own country may be the exclusive concern of the nation involved.
32. Individuals or groups, rather than states, are the perpetrators of terrorist acts. See
Bassiouni, supra note 22.
33. Although the State Department article, see supra note 28, was directed to terrorist
violence directed against diplomats, the definition of terrorism contained therein is equally
applicable to terrorist violence directed against civilians. Telephone interview with Norman
Antokol, supra note 29. The State Department article is also not limited to violence in the
form of hostage-taking. Id. Where, as in Tel-Oren, the hostage-taking situation disintegrated
into a kind of "mass murder" as the attackers proceeded to kill off their hostages when they
were cornered by police, supra note 8, the incident was considered terrorist by a United
States State Department spokesman. Id. The operative question in such incidents, according
to the State Department criteria, is whether there is a use of terror for the achievement of
political purposes. Id.
34. A political purpose motivates terrorism in the definitions of both Bassiouni, see supra
text accompanying note 22, and of the State Department, see supra text accompanying note
28.
35. See supra notes 8, 30.
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viduals as members of El Fatah against civilians.3 7 Its political
aim was to disrupt the Camp David peace process. 38  If the Tel-
Oren attack is considered an act of terrorism, the next level of
analysis is to examine whether it was in violation of the law of
nations.
II. TERRORISM AS A VIOLATION OF
THE LAW OF NATIONS
A. The Law of Nations
International law has been defined as a "body of principles,
customs, and rules which are recognized as effectively binding
obligations by sovereign states and other international persons in
their mutual relations." 39 It is generally agreed that the sources of
the law of nations are embodied in article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. 40 These sources are international
conventions, international custom, general principles of law recog-
nized by "civilized nations," and, as subsidiary means, judicial
decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified jurists. 41
The Statute of the International Court of Justice states that the
law of nations must be generally recognized and accepted by na-
tions. 42 International law is created through the openly or tacitly
expressed will of states, which agree to recognize its obligatory
character. 43 It is therefore formulated by mutual consensus.
The traditional view is that states are the subjects of international
law.44 As evidenced by treaty and international custom, however,
individuals have increasingly been said to be the subjects of interna-
36. See supra note 8.
37. Id.
38. Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 15. The purpose of the attack was allegedly to
prompt an Israeli counterattack into Lebanon, creating a climate that would make it
impossible for any Arab government to negotiate with Israel. Id. The raiders were believed to
have strongly opposed Egyptian President Sadat's peace initiative. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13,
1978, at A10, col. 3.
39. G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 3 (4th ed. 1981).
40. I.C.J. STAT., art. 38.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-12 (3d ed. 1979); H.
LAUTERPACHT, The Sources of International Law, in 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (1970).
44. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 43, at 136.
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tional law.45 This development recognizes that the dignity of the
individual is the ultimate object of international, as well as na-
tional, law.46 Therefore, international law is created by interna-
tional consensus, 47 which arises from a general recognition of moral
principles concerning the rights of man.
48
B. Conventions as Reflecting the Law of Nations
Although one nation's terrorism is another nation's liberation
movement, this lack of international consensus does not necessarily
constitute a barrier to a conclusion that terrorism is a tort in viola-
tion of international law. Nations generally view terrorism as a
violation of the law of nations, 4 and have collectively consented to
measures designed to discourage terrorist activity in the form of
international resolutions and conventions.
1. International Human Rights Conventions
The major human rights conventions include language which
may be interpreted as an interdiction of terrorism. The United
Nations Charter states generally that nations shall promote "univer-
sal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all." 50 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person" and "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.."51 This language
implies that international terrorism would constitute a violation of
human rights under international law, because the torts subsumed
under terrorism by definition involve loss of liberty, subjection to
torture, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Comparable
language appears in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
5 2
45. Id. at 141-42.
46. Id. at 148-49.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
48. See H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 43, at 143.
49. See B. JENKIVS, supra note 15, at 10.
50. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
51. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, arts. 3, 5, U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 72-73 (1948).
52. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, arts. 6(1), 7,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, 53, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966).
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the European Convention on Human Rights, 53 and the Geneva
Convention of 1949. 54
These international agreements have explicitly recognized hu-
man rights, rights which terrorist acts by definition abrogate. If a
state cannot violate theg rights in the pursuit of its ends, it stands to
reason that neither may a group of individuals infringe upon hu-
man rights in the pursuit of political or revolutionary goals.
2. International Anti-Terrorism Conventions
There is substantial consensus among Western nations that inter-
national terrorism, by its nature, violates international law. This
consensus is illustrated by several conventions intended to combat
international terrorism. The principal remedy espoused by these
conventions is to extradite terrorists to the country in which the
wrong occurred in order to face criminal charges. The Council of
Europe, for example, adopted a convention to insure that alleged
terrorists would be subject to extradition, rather than escaping
extradition on the grounds that their offenses were political. 55 In
53. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, arts. 2-3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224.
54. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
Article 3 of the Convention proscribes taking as hostages persons having no part in the
hostilities during armed conflicts of an international character. Such persons are to be
respected, protected, and treated humanely. Id. art. 3. The other three Geneva conventions
have the same provision with respect to armed conflict not of an international character.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No.
3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, openedfor signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
55. The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, opened for signature Jan.
27, 1977 (to be reported in U.N.T.S.), reprinted in CONTROL oF TERaoRIsM: INTERNATIONAL
DOCuMENTS, supra note 27, at 87. The signatories are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark,
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Id. at 92.
France, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Sweden signed with stated reservations. Id. at 93-96.
In May, 1973 the Consulative Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a recommenda-
tion "condemning international terrorist acts which, regardless of their cause, should be
punished as serious criminal offences involving the killing or endangering of the lives of
innocent people" and calling on the Committee of Ministers of the Council to establish a
definition of "political offence" in order to disallow any political justification when an act of
terrorism endangered the lives of innocent people. Id. at 96. The Assembly was acknowledg-
1982] TERRORISM AND THE LAW OF NATIONS
1978, seven Western nations56 issued a statement that they would
cease all flights to any nation that refused extradition or prosecution
of aircraft hijackers or which failed to return a hijacked aircraft. 57
The Organization of American States adopted a convention stating
that anyone charged with kidnapping, murder or assault against
those whom the state has a special duty to protect under interna-
tional law, such as diplomatic personnel, or extortion in connection
with those crimes, would be subject to extradition and prosecu-
tion. 58 The convention explicitly equated kidnapping, murder and
assault which have international import with terrorism. 59
The General Assembly of the United Nations has also addressed
the issue of international terrorism. The United Nations, however,
found it more practical to divide the problem of terrorism into its
component parts and to condemn those parts rather than to define
ing that some crimes are so "odious" that they cannot be executed as "political offences"
precluding extradition. Id. It was recommended that States receiving extradition requests
take into account the seriousness of the crime charged. Id.
The Convention itself was intended to fill the legal loophole existing in international
extradition agreements, by removing the "political offence" exception to extradition for
terrorists. Id. at 98. There was no generally accepted definition of political offense; it was left
to the discretion of each nation. Id. The Convention specified offenses that would never be
regarded as political, and offenses that might or might not be regarded as political. Id.
Offenses that would never fall within the "political offence" exception included aircraft
hijacking, attacks upon diplomats, kidnapping or taking hostages, and attacks using danger-
ous weapons such as bombs or grenades. Id. at 87-88. The contracting nations were free to
decide whether or not to treat as political offenses those acts of violence not listed above. Id.
at 88.
56. Participating countries included Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United
Kingdom and United States. Bonn Economic Summit Declaration, Joint Statement, July 17,
1978, DEP'T. ST. BULL., Sept. 1978, at 2, 5.
57. The statement expressed concern on the subject of terrorism and the taking of hostages,
and declared that the participating governments would "intensify their joint efforts to
combat international terrorism." Id. at 5.
58. Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971,
37 O.A.S. arts 2-3, T.S. 6, 7, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 255, 256 (1971).
59. Id. The convention states in pertinent part:
The contracting states undertake to [take measures] . . . to prevent and punish
acts of terrorism, especially kidnapping, murder, and other assaults against the life
or physical integrity of those persons to whom the state has the duty according to
international law to give special protection, as well as extortion in connection with
those crimes.
id. art. 1.
"[K]idnapping, murder, and other assaults [as stated above] . . . shall be
considered common crimes of international significance, regardless of motive."
Id. art. 2.
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terrorism for the purpose of condemning it as a whole.60 Within
those limits, the United Nations has attempted to address the issue
in the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages.,,
After much bargaining and compromise,6 2 the convention was di-
luted by an article which stated that the convention would not
apply to hostage-taking when it is a part of a fight against colonial
domination, alien occupation or racist regimes in exercising the
right of self-determination.6 3 The convention nonetheless states that
hostage-taking is a crime that shall be prosecuted and punished.6 4
The United States position, as enunciated by the State Depart-
ment, is that the international community must develop a consen-
sus to outlaw terrorism and bring terrorists to justice. 5 The State
Department has lauded measures taken by the United Nations to
outlaw crimes against diplomats and the taking of hostages 6 as
"steps in the right direction of establishing an international consen-
sus and body of law outlawing crimes against diplomats. '6 7
60. An example of a working paper submitted to the United Nations by the United States
which concerns terrorism as a whole is the Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism, submitted to the General Assembly in 1972.
It was never acted upon. 27 U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 92) at 3, U.N. Doe. A/C.6/.
L.851 (1973), reprinted in 67 DEP'T ST. BULL. 431 (1972).
One extravagantly titled United Nations resolution exemplifies the problems that organi-
zation has had in making sweeping pronouncements on the subject of terrorism: Measures to
Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or
Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms and Study of the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of
Terrorism and Acts of Violence Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair
and Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an
Attempt to Effect Radical Changes, G.A. Res. 31/102, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 185-
86, U.N. Doe. A/RES/31/102 (1977), reprinted in R.A. FIEDLANDER, 1 TmwomSM 115 (1979).
61. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 23, U.N. Doe. A/34/39
(1979) [hereinafter cited as International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages].
62. Note, The United Nations Effort to Draft a Convention on the Taking of Hostages, 27
AM. U.L. Ray. 433 (1978).
63. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 61, at 6. As of
this writing, the convention is three ratifications or accessions short of the 22 needed for entry
into force. The United States is a signatory, but has not ratified or acceded. Telephone
interview with Julio A. Baez, Associate Legal Officer, Treaty Section, Office of Legal Affairs,
United Nations (Sept. 20, 1982).
64. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 61, Preamble.
65. Perez, supra note 28, at 27.
66. See id. at 28.
67. Id. at 28 (emphasis added). Although the article refers specifically to crimes against
diplomats, it applies equally to terrorism committed against civilians, as in the Tel-Oren
case. Telephone interview with Norman Antokol, supra note 29.
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Consequently, although there is lack of consensus on the defini-
tion of terrorism, there is a uniformity of purpose in seeking to
prevent and punish acts of terrorism. This is an implicit recognition
that terrorism is a violation of law, because there must be illegality
for punishment to be imposed. In addition, the general statements
of human rights conventions demonstrate international consensus
that torture and cruel and inhuman treatment, components of
terrorist acts, are violations of international law. 8 Thus, sufficient
international consensus has been demonstrated for terrorism to be
deemed a violation of the law of nations.
III. THE LAW OF NATIONS IN THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
AS CONSTRUED IN UNITED STATES CASE LAW
A. The Law of Nations in the Alien Tort Statute
Prior to Tel-Oren
The earliest cases under the Alien Tort Statute show only isolated
instances of what constitutes a violation of the law of nations.6 9 For
example, early cases have held that the following acts violated the
law of nations: seizing the vessel of a peaceful nation and holding it
as a prize within United States territorial limits during peacetime; 70
unjustified seizure of an alien's property by a United States officer
in a foreign country;71 a mother's unlawfully spiriting a child from
country to country on a falsified passport.7
Recent cases denying Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction are illustra-
tive of what is not considered a violation of the law of nations in
United States courts. In Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Inter-
national Union,73 the court denied Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction,
68. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
69. See Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
70. See Moxon v. Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9,895). In Moxon, a French
captain captured a British ship within the territorial waters of the United States and brought
it to Philadelphia at a time when France and Groat Britain were at war, but Great Britain
and the United States were at peace. The court hel- that within the territorial limits of the
United States no state of war existed with Great Britain, so France could not capture the ship
of Great Britain, with which it was at war, within American waters. The law of nations
forbad the fitting out of privateers in a neutral country or capturing within its limits the
friends of a neutral. Id. at 943. The court noted that it "is particularly by law vested with
authority where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations ... and this is a
case falling under that description." Id.
71. See O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908).
72. See Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
73. 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960). An Egyptian vessel owner sought an injunction against a
union that was picketing the Egyptian vessel because of Egypt's alleged blacklisting of
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holding that the law of nations did not confer upon vessels of all
nations an unrestricted right of access to United States harbors.
74
Unseaworthiness, negligence 75 and theft76 have also been held not to
rise to the level of a violation of the law of nations and thus not to
confer subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute.
American ships. Id. at 50. The court held that there was no ground for an injunction under
the Alien Tort Statute because no treaty existed between the United States and Egypt
granting Egyptian ships free access to American ports, and plaintiff had not shown that the
law of nations accords an unrestricted right of access to harbors by vessels of all nations. Id. at
52.
74. Id.
75. See Lopes, 225 F. Supp. at 294-97. This was an action by an alien against a vessel
owner for unseaworthiness and negligence. The court analyzed unseaworthiness and ob-
served it has many characteristics usually associated with contracts. However, since histori-
cally the action was brought in tort, the court would assume that unseaworthiness was a "tort
only." Id. at 294. The next question was whether the tort was committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States. Id. By an historical analysis of the develop-
ment of the doctrine of unseaworthiness, the court concluded that the awarding of damages
for injuries caused by unseaworthiness originated in the courts as a uniquely American
doctrine. The doctrine of unseaworthiness was based in neither the law of nations nor any
United States treaty. Id. at 295.
The court then analyzed negligence as a tort in violation of the law of nations. The court
examined the writings of jurists for instruction as to the content of the law of nations and as to
what constitutes a violation of the law of nations. Id. at 295-97. One jurist had listed passport
violations, coercion of ambassadors, piracy and slave trade as offenses against the law of
nations. Id. at 297. The court also considered cases that construed the phrase "law of nations"
as it appears in the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Cases have
considered the following to be violations of the law of nations: violations of the laws of war,
suppression of the slave trade, harassment of foreign diplomatic representatives, and counter-
feiting the notes of foreign countries. Id. at 296,
Therefore, and examination of both the writings of jurists and United States case law as to
what constitutes a violation of the law of nations resulted in nothing to indicate that
negligence was treated as such a violation. Id. at 297. The court used the following definition
of the law of nations: "The Law of Nations . . . may be defined as the body of rules and
principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one
another." Id. at 297 n.29 (citation'omitted).
76. IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). With reference to the tort of
theft, the court observed:
Here there is no allegation of anyone's violating a treaty. The reference to the law of
nations must be narrowly read if the section is to be kept ivithin the confines of
Article III. We cannot subscribe to plaintiffs' view that the Eighth Commandment
"Thou shalt not steal" is part of the law of nations. While every civilized nation
doubtless has this as a part of its legal system, a violation of the law of nations arises
only when there has been "a violation by one or more individuals of those stand-
ards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an
individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good
and/or in dealings inter se."
Id. (quoting Lopes, 225 F. Supp. at 297) (emphasis added).
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Recent Alien Tort Statute cases have several common elements.
Dreyfus v. von Finck7 7 illustrates two important issues: treaties
underlying an Alien Tort Statute claim must specifically confer
private rights enforceable by individuals, 78 and the law of nations is
concerned with relationships among states, not individuals. 79 The
court held that a .finding of violation of the law of nations was
barred where the parties to a dispute were individuals.80 The court
in IT v. Vencap, Ltd.81 stated that a violation of the law of nations
occurs only when it affects the relationship between states or be-
tween an individual and a foreign state.8 2 The court in Cohen v.
Hartman8 3 defined international law as "the rules of conduct which
govern the affairs of this nation, acting in its national capacity, in
its relationships with any other nation. "84 These cases illustrate
that, for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute, the law of nations must
be construed narrowly, and violations of the law of nations must be
flagrant. 85
77. 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976). A German expatriate, now a
Swiss citizen, sued a German citizen under § 1350 for alleged wrongful confiscation of his
property during Nazi rule. Section 1350 jurisdiction was based on defendant's alleged viola-
tion of four treaties to which the United States was a signatory. Id. at 26. The district court
dismissed the complaint because it held that none of the treaties gave plaintiff a private right
of recovery. Id. at 27. The district court then held it had jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's
treaty-based claims under § 1350. Id. at 28.
The court stated that a United States treaty is a contract with another nation which
under the United States Constitution is accorded the same treatment as a United States law.
Id. at 29. A treaty may contain provisions conferring private rights on individuals who are
citizens of the contracting parties. Id. However, this is not generally true. "It is only when a
treaty is self-executing, when it prescribes rules by which private rights may be determined,
that it may be relied upon for the enforcement of such rights." Id. at 30 (citation omitted).
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court, ruling that none of the treaties relied upon
applied to expropriation of the property of an individual by a citizen of the same country (as
in the case) and none conferred private rights enforceable in American courts. Id. at 30.
With respect to § 1350, the court of appeals stated that the law of nations deals with the
relationship between nations, not individuals, although individuals may be greatly affected
by the law of nations. Id. at 30-31. "Like a general treaty, the law of nations has been held
not to be self-executing so as to vest a plaintiff with individual legal rights." Id. at 31 (citation
omitted).
78. See id. at 30-31.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
82. Id. at 1015.
83. 490 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Fla. 1980), afJ'd, 634 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
84. Id. at 519 (citation omitted).
85. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015. These themes are illustrated in recent cases holding theft,
id., unseaworthiness, Lopes, 225 F. Supp. at 295, negligence, id. at 297, and embezzlement,
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The seminal case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala88 represented a sharp
break with previous interpretations of the Alien Tort Statute. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in Filartiga that torture is a
tort in violation of the law of nations because it contravenes univer-
sally accepted norms of international human rights law.8 7 The court
Cohen v. Hartman, 490 F. Supp. at 519, did not constitute violations of the law of nations so
as to confer Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction.
In Cohen, where a Canadian plaintiff alleged embezzlement by his former employee, the
court held that the acts alleged were not so flagrant as to rise to the level of a violation of
international law. Id.
86. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
87. Id. at 878. Plaintiffs in Filartiga were from Paraguay. They were the father and sister
of a seventeen-year-old boy who had been allegedly tortured to death in Paraguay by a police
official, Pena. Plaintiffs alleged that the boy was killed in retaliation for his father's political
activities. Id. When Pena came to the United States on a visitor's visa he was served with a
summons and complaint for wrongful death by torture by the Filartigas. Id. at 879. The
complaint stated a cause of action arising under the wrongful death statutes, the United
Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other human rights
documents. Id. Jurisdiction was claimed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. IV 1980) (federal
question statute) and 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976) (Alien Tort Statute). Id.
The district court dismissed the complaint on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 880. The court
felt constrained by the dicta of lIT v. Vencap, Ltd. and Dreyfus v. von Finck, to construe
narrowly tht term "law of nations" in the Alien Tort Statute to exclude law governing a
state's treatment of its own citizens Id.
The Filartigas based their appeal primarily on the argument that torture was a violation
of the law of nations and, therefore, subject matter jurisdiction was proper under the Alien
Tort Statute. See id. The court of appeals, considering the universal condemnation of torture
in numerous international agreements and its renunciation by all nations, held that torture
committed by a state official violated the law of nations. Id. Therefore the court upheld
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute. See id.
The court first inquired into the sources of international law, including the works of
jurists, the customs and usages of nations, and judicial decisions. Id. Recognizing that
international law is not immutable, but changes over time by "the general assent of civilized
nations," id. at 881, the court interpreted international law in its modern form, not as it was
when the Alien Tort Statute was enacted in 1789. Id.
In determining the content of international law in its present form, the court of appeals
looked to a number of conventions.Id. at 881-84. These included the United Nations Charter,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture. Id. at 881-83. Though it could be argued that these
declarations are not legally binding, the court found that United Nations treaties and
resolutions established the human rights obligations of member nations. The court reasoned
that by making these declarations, the declarant nations created an expectation that they
would be adhered to, and the declarations would thereby become binding on nations as part
of customary international law. Id. at 883.
To demonstrate international consensus against the use of torture, the court cited many
treaties and accords which renounce torture. Id. at 883-84. Although torture may have been
commonly utilized by nations when the Alien Tort Statute was enacted in 1789, by the
evolution of international custom, it had been renounced by all nations and was therefore
forbidden by international law. Id. at 884.
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reached this conclusion by finding that international conventions
and accords reflected universal agreement among nations that the
use of torture was forbidden and a violation of the law of nations. 88
Filartiga differed with previous case law on the Alien Tort Stat-
ute in several key areas. It held that international law may address
a relationship among individuals, if one party represents a state,
even when both parties are nationals of the same state. 89 This was a
departure from Dreyfus v. von Finck,90 which stated the traditional
rule that the proper subject matter of the law of nations is the
relationship among nations, not individuals.9' Filartiga held that
Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction may be found if the law of nations is
violated.9 2 Contrary to Dreyfus's conclusion that a plaintiff must
have individual legal rights under either treaties or the law of
nations for a private right of action to exist,93 Filartiga implied that
the law of nations need not provide a private cause of action. 4
However, prior case law and Filartiga were consistent in holding
that a violation of the law of nations had to be flagrant and that
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute could only be found if the
The court rejected the dictum in Dreyfus v. von Finck that there is no violation of
international law when both parties are nationals of the acting state. International law,
stated the court, confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own governments,
including the right to be free from torture. Id. at 884-85.
The court also rejected the claim that jurisdiction of the case was inconsistent with Article
III of the Constitution. Id. at 885. The law of nations, which is part of federal common law,
is the constitutional basis for the Alien Tort Statute. Id. Since international law is embodied
in American common law, the Alien Tort Statute was consistent with Article III. Id. at 886.
The court also rejected the claim that the law of nations forms a part of United States law
only to the extent Congress has acted to define it. It noted Chief Justice Marshall's statement
in The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815), that, in the absence of statutory law,
United States courts are "bound by the law of nations, which is a part of the law of the land."
630 F.2d at 887.
The court then addressed Pena's argument that international law, as reflected in treaties
and declarations, is not self-executing. Id. at 889. The court stated that this is a choice of law
question.
Thus, the court concluded that, through the evolution of customary international law, the
right of all persons to be free of torture has been recognized by all nations. Id. at 890. "[The
torturer-has become ... hostis humani generig, an enemy of all mankind." Id.
88. 630 F.2d at 880.
89. Id. at 884-85.
90. 534 F.2d 24; see supra text and accompanying notes 77-80.
91. 534 F.2d at 30-31.
92. 630 F.2d at 887, 889.
93. 534 F.2d at 31.
94. Filartiga did not require plaintiffs to demonstrate that a specific provision of interna-
tional law gave them a private cause of action. They only had to show that the sources of
international law prohibited official torture. 630 F.2d at 884.
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violation was of a well established and universally recognized norm
of international law.95
The split between lIT v. Vencap, Ltd. and Dreyfus v. von Finck,
on the one hand, and Filartiga, on the other, appears to be based
upon the importance that each attaches to two different sources of
international law. One view, represented by Vencap and Dreyfus,
places great weight on treaties containing specific provisions that
expressly or impliedly provide a private cause of action. 6 The other
view, represented by Filartiga, sees international law as a con-
stantly evolving process reflected in a growing body of international
agreements which define norms of international behavior. 7 The
Filartiga view would allow principles which have been universally
accepted by nations to be admitted into the corpus of international
law. As the law of nations, these principles would become part of
the common law, enforceable in United States courts without pro-
vision for a private cause of action. Pursuant to this view, human
rights which have been accepted in principle by virtually all nations
are the proper subject of international law. Therefore a nation's
treatment of its own citizens, a human rights question, is a proper
subject of international law. By acknowledging international decla-
rations on human rights as part of binding, customary international
law,98 the Filartiga court implicitly recognized that international
law must safeguard individual rights.
B. The Tel-Oren Case: Private Cause of Action Under
the Law of Nations as a Requisite to Alien
Tort Statute Jurisdiction
1. The District Court Opinion in Tel-Oren
The district court addressed only one of the two major issues
presented in Tel-Oren. The issue of whether Tel-Oren was a case of
terrorism and whether terrorism is a violation of international law
for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute was never reached. The court
rejected jurisdiction on the ground that the law of nations must
contain a private right of action enforceable by individuals before
95. Cohen v. Hartman, 490 F.Supp. at 519; Fflartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 887-88.
96. See H. LAuErPACHT, supra note 43, at 58-61.
97. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 43, at 2.
98. 630 F.2d at 883.
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Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction could be found." The court said that
the law of nations cited by plaintiffs did not confer such rights upon
individuals. 100 There was no jurisdiction as to any of the defendants
because:
[The Alien Tort Statute] . . .serves merely as an entrance into
the federal courts and in no way provides a cause of action to
any plaintiff. Somewhere in the law of nations or in the treaties
of the United States, the plaintiffs must discern and plead a
cause of action that, if proved, would permit the Court to grant
relief.101
Citing dictum in HT v. Vencap, Ltd.,102 the Tel-Oren court
stated that the term "law of nations" in the Alien Tort Statute must
be construed narrowly if the statute is to remain within the bounds
of Article III of the United States Constitution.'0 3 If section 1350
jurisdiction were allowed without provision for private rights of
action under treaty or law of nations, warned the court, "federal
99. In arguing for jurisdiction under the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp.
IV 1980), plaintiffs had cited the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, supra note 54, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 51, the
United Nations Charter, supra note 50, and numerous other treaties and conventions. 517
F.Supp. at 545-46. The court stated that treaties must provide expressly or impliedly for a
private right of action before an individual can assert a claim under the treaty. Id.at 546.
The court discussed several cases in support of this proposition. In Z & F Assets Realiza-
tion Corp. v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464 (D.C. Cir. 1940), aff'd on other grounds, 311 U.S. 470
(1941), plaintiffs presented a petition for an injunction prohibiting the government from
paying awards made by an international commission created after World War I. 114 F.2d at
467. The court held that the plaintiffs could not raise the claim because an individual has no
legal right to participate in an award. Id.at 472. In Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States,
430 F.Supp. 1168 (D.D.C. 1977), affd in part and rev'd and remanded in part on other
grounds, 663 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the court declared that without provision giving
private parties the right of enforcement, an individual injured by a government's failure to
enforce a treaty had no legal redress. It was a political question and he must look to his
government for relief. 430 F. Supp. at 1172.
In Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976), plaintiff asked the courts to
compel enforcement of a United Nations resolution calling upon member states to boycott
South Africa. Id. at 849. The court of appeals held that no private right of enforcement
existed. "[Tihe U.N. resolution underlying that obligation does not confer rights on the
citizens of the United States that are enforceable in court in the absence of implementing
legislation." Id. at 850.
Since the treaties cited by plaintiffs in Tel-Oren provided neither expressly nor impliedly
for private rights of action, 517 F. Supp. at 547-48, there was no federal question presented.
Id. at 548. The court also rejected plaintiffs' claim that federal common law included the law
of nations. Id.
100. 517 F. Supp. at 548.
101. Id. at 549.
102. 519 F.2d at 1015.
103. 517 F. Supp. at 550.
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courts would clutch power over cases, under the guise of the law of
nations, undoubtedly casting effect on international relations and
foreign policy when no country, friend or foe, has consented to an
American court opening its door to one alleging violations of inter-
national legal principles. "104
2. Judicial Interference in Foreign Affairs: Filartiga v. Tel-Oren
The Tel-Oren court's refusal to grant federal subject matter juris-
diction under the Alien Tort Statute thus appears to have been
influenced by its reluctance to intervene judicially in the area of
foreign affairs. 105 The court was unwilling to impose United States
law upon foreign parties who had not consented to be bound by it,
and was equally unwilling to decree judicial solutions in the area of
foreign policy, traditionally the realm of the executive and legisla-
tive branch of government. 10
Filartiga, on the other hand, found it unnecessary to require that
treaties and the law of nations expressly or impliedly provide for a
cause of action.107 It recognized the existence of universally ac-
cepted standards of conduct to which nations have consented to be
held through the weight of international custom. 108 In Filartiga,
this idea was so compelling to the court, that enforcement of inter-
national conduct by United States courts was less influential than
the fact that international law binds one and all to a certain level of
respect for those norms. 109 Once these universally accepted norms
were found to exist, the Filartiga court felt obliged to enforce them.
Therefore, the importance of human rights, specifically the right to
be free of torture, outweighed the possible dangers of judicial activ-
ism." 0 In fact, the court held that the Alien Tort Statute was
consistent with article III and the exercise of judicial scrutiny."'
104. Id.
105. See supra text accompanying note 104.
106. See id.
107. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
108. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 878, 890.
109. See id.
110. See id. The Second Circuit in Filartiga stated that the Alien Tort Statute demon-
strated the wisdom of the First Congress in vesting jurisdiction over alien tort claims in the
federal district courts. "Questions of this nature are fraught with implications for the nation as
a whole, and therefore should not be left to the potentially varying adjudications of the courts
of the fifty states." Id. at 890.
111. Id. at 885-86. The constitutional basis for the Alien Tort Statute is the law of nations,
which is part of federal common law. Id. at 886. Further, courts often adjudicate tort claims
arising outside their territorial jurisdiction, applying the laws of the jurisdiction or state
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3. Should a Private Right of Action Be Required in Tel-Oren?
The district court in Tel-Oren refused to grant Alien Tort Statute
jurisdiction. As rationale, it extended to the Alien Tort Statute the
doctrine that treaties must provide a private right of action in order
for individuals to sue upon them. 112 This extension is highly ques-
tionable.
There is ample precedent for the proposition that before an
individual may state a federal question claim under a treaty, the
treaty must allow a private right of action." 3 Thus, if federal
question jurisdiction in Tel-Oren rested on treaties which did not
expressly or impliedly provide a private right of action, the federal
question claim was properly denied. 1 4 However, the meaning that
where the tort occurred. Id. at 885. Since international law is embodied in American
common law, and became part of the common law of the United States at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, the Alien Tort Statute was authorized by article III. Id. at 885-
86.
112. 517 F. Supp. at 546.
113. See supra note 99.
114. Through interpretation, courts may find intent that a treaty be self-executing from its
language, or, if its language is uncertain, by examining the circumstances surrounding its
execution. Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d at 851. Thus, in Tel-Oren the court of appeals may
look to the intent of the treaties cited by plaintiffs to determine if they imply a right to a
private cause of action.
In Guerrero ex rel. Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974),
plaintiffs claimed a private right of action based on a Trusteeship Agreement pursuant to
which the United States was authorized to administer the territory of Micronesia. The court
interpreted the language of the Trusteeship Agreement to indicate intent that plaintiffs be
afforded a private right of action without any further enabling legislation. Id.at 97-98. The
court relied on language providing that the United States was required to "promote the
economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the inhabitants, and to this end . . . regulate
the use of natural resources" and to "protect the inhabitants against the loss of their lands and
resources." Id. at 97. This phraseology is similar to that found in the treaties and covenants
cited by the. Tel-Oren plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit stated that whether an international
agreement established private rights of action without implementing legislation depended on
contextual factors: "[T]he purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators, the
existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for direct implementation, the
availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and the immediate and long-
range social consequences of self- or non-self-execution." Id.
The court also looked at features in the Trusteeship Agreement which suggested an
intention to establish judicially enforceable rights.
The issue involves the local economy and environment, not security; the concern
with natural resources and the concern with political development are explicit in the
agreement and are general international concerns as well; the enforcement of these
rights requires little legal or administrative innovation in the domestic fora; and the
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the federal question issue has for Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction is
difficult to discern. It appears that the court was analogizing and
perhaps confusing private rights under a treaty for federal question
purposes with private rights under the law of nations for purposes
of the Alien Tort Statute. Contrary to the requirement of private
rights of action for federal question jurisdiction under a treaty,
there appears to be no requirement of private right of action for the
law of nations according to the Alien Tort Statute's plain language.
The court in Dreyfus v. von Finck stated: "It is only when a
treaty is self-executing, when it prescribes rules by which private
rights may be determined, that it may be relied upon for the
enforcement of such rights." 5 In making their claim under the
Alien Tort Statute, however, the plaintiff-appellants in Tel-Oren
are not relying upon treaties for the enforcement of their rights, nor
are they relying upon international law for the direct enforcement
of rights. They are relying simply upon the language of the Alien
Tort Statute. The statute makes reference to the law of nations or to
treaty, but it does not require that they provide for private right of
enforcement; the Alien Tort Statute itself provides for private rights
of enforcement via the federal courts. Plaintiffs rely on treaties to
demonstrate the content of international law, in order to show that
the tort is in violation of the law of nations.
The Tel-Oren plaintiffs argue that the torts involved in terrorism
violate the law of nations as evidenced by treaties and international
conventions."" They use these documents to demonstrate that ter-
rorism has been universally condemned by nations, in the same way
alternative forum, the Security Council, would present to the plaintiffs obstacles so
great as to make their rights virtually unenforceable.
Id. at 97-98.
So, too, the court of appeals might find that the human rights claims asserted by plaintiffs
in Tel-Oren are equally appropriate matters for judicial enforcement as issues involving the
local economy and environment. Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 39.
Another case, Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1977), is instructive in this regard.
There the court noted that the Micronesian Trusteeship Agreement contained a pledge by
Congress "to encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all." Id. at
626. It stated that although the agreement may not have amounted to a legally enforceable
guarantee of substantive rights to Micronesians, it is an expression of moral principle not
lightly to be disregarded. Id. Similarly, the court of appeals, in deciding Tel-Oren, may hold
that the language of United Nations treaties and resolutions calling for respect for human
rights and condemning terrorism also reflect moral principles not to be lightly disregarded.
115. 534 F. Supp. at 30.
116. 517 F. Supp. at 545-46.
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that Filartiga demonstrated, through the universal renunciation of
torture by nations, that torture is a violation of the law of na-
tions. 117
The Tel-Oren plaintiffs refute the requirement of a private cause
of action on the ground that a cause of action for violation of
international law arises automatically under the domestic law of
the United States which includes the law of nations. I"' The cause of
action does not arise under international law; international law
merely provides the normative right."'
If a private right of action had to be specifically provided in the
law of nations in order for jurisdiction to lie under the Alien Tort
Statute, there would be no need for such a statute. A plaintiff could
sue directly under the law of nations, citing international law as
embodied in the federal common law.
It is reasonable to assume that the First Congress would not have
passed the Alien Tort Statute unless it were meant to fill a gap left
unremedied by other means, that is, if there were no private right
of action under the law of nations directly. Therefore, the require-
ment of a private right of action in international law erects a
barrier to use of the statute that is logically at odds with both its
plain language and the probable intention of its framers.
IV. POSSIBLE OUTCOMES IF ALIEN TORT STATUTE
JURISDICTION IS UPHELD IN TEL-OREN
The plaintiffs in Tel-Oren and the court of appeals in Filartiga
relied on United Nations resolutions and international covenants to
demonstrate the content of the law of nations for purposes of pro-
viding Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction. 120 If the law of nations is said
to be evidenced by such resolutions and covenants, it is possible that
117. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 880-85.
118. Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 25-26. See also supra note 111.
119. One commentator has noted:
It is . . . unrealistic to contend that the significance of . . . [U.N.] resolutions
completely disappears by virtue of their designation as not legally binding. There-
fore, the crucial point is not the legal status of the resolutions themselves, but the
degree to which they influence the conduct and attitude of States towards accept-
ance or rejection of a particular rule of international law crystallized through the
process of multilateral diplomacy.
Adede, International Law from a Common Law Perspective: A Second Look, 60 B.U.L.
REv. 46, 76 (1980).
120. Appellants' Brief, supra note 3, at 25. See also supra, note 111. See Appellants' Brief,
supra note 3, at 27; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 880-85.
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aliens may use this precedent to gain access to federal court on far
less substantial grounds than those presented by Tel-Oren and Fi-
lartiga. United Nations declarations are often aspirational in na-
ture, rather than strictly prescriptive. There have been treaties
condemning racism and undertaking to eliminate it, 121 undertaking
to ensure economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to
work, to an adequate standard of living, to physical and mental
health, and to take part in cultural life.12 2 The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights states in article 25 that everyone has a right to
an adequate standard of living. 123
Consequently, it is possible that an alien from a Third World
country could sue an American multinational corporation for de-
priving him of the adequate standard of living guaranteed him by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Or, a South African
black might seek redress against a South African official in federal
court for systematic, official racism, which has been proscribed by
a United Nations convention, and which could therefore plausibly
be called a violation of the law of nations. In these cases the Alien
Tort Statute would still have to be construed narrowly as requiring
flagrant violations of the law of nations. 12 4 A federal court would
doubtlessly weigh the severity of' the violation claimed. The court
would also measure the universality of international opinion as to
whether the tort was in violation of international law. This type of
conservative approach would limit jurisdiction to the most flagrant
cases of human rights violations.
In a suit against a United States multinational corporation by a
citizen of a Third World nation, the court might find that since
there is no universal measure of an adequate standard of living, the
law of nations does not guarantee a specific standard. Indeed, it
would be difficult to prove proximate cause between actions of
121. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
G.A. Res. 20/2106, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47-52, U.N. Doe. A/RES/2106 (1966),
reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 350 (1966).
122. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 4950-51, U.N. Doc. A/6316, arts. 7 ,11(1),1 2 (1),15(1)(a),
(1966).
123. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 51. An adequate standard of
living includes food, clothing, housing, medical care, social services and security in case of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or lack of livelihood due to circum-
stances beyond one's control. Id. art. 25, para. 1.
124. See supra notes 76 & 99 and accompanying text.
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United States corporations and the situation of Third World nation-
als.
As to a claim by a South African black on the cause of action of
racism, there exists a strong body of international conventions con-
demning racism, particularly official apartheid. 1 25 A claim of rac-
ism may fail, however, because it is not recognized as a tort in
American courts. 126 It would also fail on the basis of the act of state
doctrine, 27 under which United States courts will not examine the
legality of actions of foreign officials taken under the laws of foreign
states. Since a South African official is acting in accordance with
the laws and the constitution of his country, the act of state doctrine
would bar an American court from examining the legality of his
actions. 128
Thus, if terrorism were upheld by the court of appeals as a
violation of the law of nations, it would hardly "open the flood-
gates." Courts would still be compelled to strictly interpret the law
of nations for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute.
CONCLUSION
This Note demonstrates that the torts which comprise terrorism
may be sued upon by an alien because terrorism is a violation of the
law of nations for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute. 29 The lack of
a universal definition of terrorism does not bar a conclusion that
terrorism is a violation of the law of nations1 30 because there exists a
consensus among nations that terrorism is an offense that must be
125. See, e.g., supra note 121.
126. However, several cases have held that racial slurs may be the basis for a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2
Cal.3d 493, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216 (1970); Browning v. Slenderella Systems, 54
Wash.2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959).
127. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 43, at 507-08.
128. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Under the act of state
doctrine, judicial inquiry into Cuban confiscation of private property was precluded because
the nationalization was the public act of a recognized foreign sovereign power committed in
its own territory. Id. at 413-15. This applied even though the foreign expropriation violated
customary international law. Id. at 427-37.
In cases claiming terrorism as a tort in violation of the law of nations, as in Tel-Oren, the
act of state doctrine would probably not be raised by a defendant state (such as Libya)
because it is highly unlikely that any state, however renegade, would care to identify itself
with the legal sanctioning of terrorism. Therefore, states participating in and aiding terrorist
activities would in all likelihood not afford themselves the shield of the act of state doctrine.
129. See supra notes 49-68 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 15-38 and accompanying text.
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prevented and punished. '31 In addition, there is no need for the law
of nations to provide a specific right to a private cause of action for
Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction,' 32 as a treaty must for federal ques-
tion jurisdiction. Conferral of Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction in a
case alleging terrorism in violation of international law does not
constitute undue interference in the executive foreign policy-mak-
ing perogative. 133 Terrorism so clearly violates the norms of interna-
tional behavior that judicial sanctions for terrorist activities are in
keeping with national policy. The decision of the district court in
Tel-Oren should therefore be reversed and jurisdiction upheld un-
der the Alien Tort Statute.
Eileen Rose Pollock
131. See supra notes 49, 68 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
